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ABSTRACT 
Global Force Management (GFM) is a force-allocation process-driven system that 
distributes military forces across the globe to meet Combatant Commander objectives. 
The goal is to match military capabilities provided by the military services to Geographic 
Combatant Commander requirements. This thesis is a proof of concept for an 
optimization model that maximizes the distribution of a finite number of full motion 
video intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to a prioritized list of 
requirements to meet national security objectives. 
This thesis examines the ISR GFM process. With the insight gained to the 
process, the model applies a mixed integer linear programming formulation to provide 
an optimized force allocation recommendation The model’s objective function managed 
the trade-off between FADM priority and platform consideration, which optimized 
the allocation 902 hours per day of full motion video to meet 1902 hours per day of 
20 CCDR requirements.  
The research, methodology, and analyses presented in this thesis is a successful 
proof of concept proving that this optimization model will objectively inform senior 
decision makers in the Department of Defense for intelligence surveillance 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Global Force Management (GFM) is a force-allocation process-driven system that 
distributes military forces across the globe to meet Combatant Commander objectives. 
The goal of GFM is to match military capabilities provided by the Services to Geographic 
Combatant Commander requirements. This thesis is a proof of concept for an 
optimization model that maximizes the distribution of finite number of assets to a 
prioritized list of requirements. 
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directs the Global Force Management 
(GFM) allocation process in the Dissemination and Guidance for the Employment of the 
Force. The National Strategic Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National 
Military Strategy direct, guide, and inform the GFM process. The National Strategic 
Strategy establishes national priorities; the National Defense Strategy guides the 
Department of Defense (DOD), which along with the National Military Strategy, 
provides strategic direction. 
The GFM process organizes and distributes military forces to meet Geographic 
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) requirements. The allocation process looks across the 
entire DOD to identify and recommend the most appropriate and responsive force that 
can meet CCDR requirements. Each force request culminates in a Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) decision and subsequent deployment order to allocate a force. The forces 
come from several sources, including: a Service Secretary such as the Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, or Air Force; a CCDR’s assigned forces; or forces from other DOD 
Agencies. The SECDEF allocates the forces to the requesting CCDR based on informed 
recommendations from the Joint Staff. The design of the entire global force management 
process allows the SECDEF to make prioritized decisions for the employment of the 
force. The product of the GFM process is deployed military forces to the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders (CCDR). 
____________________ 
1. Secretary of Defense. 2015. (U) Dissemination of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force.
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. This document is classifed SECRET. 
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This thesis focuses on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities within the GFM process. Typically, ISR capabilities such as full motion 
video (FMV) are in high demand by CCDRs. However, the availability of ISR platforms 
is severely limited. ISR capability is described as high demand and low density. Because 
of the ability of ISR platforms potentially to provide capability to multiple CCDRs from a 
common operating location and competing demands for mission critical requirements, the 
allocation of ISR forces includes close coordination between the Joint Staff, CCDRs, 
force providers, and the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC ISR).  
The challenge with the current ISR allocation process is objectively quantifying 
the reason behind a recommended sourcing solution for ISR global allocation. Current 
military operations across the globe experience more demand from the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders (GCC) than the Force Providers have assets available to meet 
the GCC requirements. The Joint Staff, in concert with USSTRATCOM, use many 
factors to prioritize allocation of assets to include determining which GCC gets the assets 
and for how long. The decision influencers recommend a resource allocation solution 
based on experience, force capacity, GCC demand, and the strategic environment 
provided by guidance from the National Security Council (NSC).  
The ISR allocation optimization model applies to any of the ISR requirement 
capabilities, including but not limited to Full Motion Video (FMV), Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT), Communications Intelligence (COMINT), and other intelligence collection 
capabilities. The complexity of FMV force allocation makes FMV the ideal capability to 
use for a proof of concept.  
Hypothetical data is used to keep this thesis unclassified. The platform 
capabilities come from a small sampling of ISR FMV platforms that have sufficient 
open-source information to make the model relevant. The hypothetical CCDR 
requirements are derived from and loosely based on historical data from GFMAP force 
allocations. Actual CCDR requirements, force capacities, and FADM priorities are 
classified. The model uses a methodical approach using known data and informed 
assumptions to develop reasonable scenarios to implement in the model.  
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This optimization model and its methodology uses full motion video capability 
and notional requirements to model the applicably of optimization in the Global Force 
Management allocation process. The model uses an objective function that to maximize 
the hours of FMV allocated to each CCDR to meet the prioritized mission requirements. 
The objective function manages the trade-off between ISR platform constraints and 
CCDR requirements constraints.  
Results from the base model, which only considered FADM for allocation 
prioritization, shows that with only 902 hours per day of FMV capacity to meet 1902 
hours per day of requirements, the optimized solution provided 100 percent of the 
requirement capability to 12 of the 20 CCDR requirements and a partial allocation of 39 
hours per day or nine percent of the requirement to the single next lowest FADM priority 
requirement. These results are useful to inform senior decision makers within the DOD of 
which requirements will not receive a capability allocation. The results can be compared 
against the actual Global Force Management Allocation Plans to highlight which lower 
FADM priorities are actually receiving a force allocation. The reasons for the differences 
can inform decision makers that the strategic priorities do not align to how the allocation 
is being allocated. For force providers and DOD budget personnel, the gaps highlight 
areas where additional resources can be committed to meet strategic objectives. 
Combining and balancing FADM and platform consideration into the 
optimization model allows decision makers a model that more closely resembles current 
allocation methods. The results of the combined model change if we modify the valueij 
parameter for a particular platform. This change may represent where the platform 
consideration is modified based on new information or just to examine model sensitivity. 
This is the expected result because the model is using the product of platform 
consideration times the FADM priority to define valueij in the objective function. The 
objective function manages the trade-off between FADM priority and platform 
consideration. The combined model more closely simulates how the force allocations 
recommendations are made because it takes into account regional geographic realities 
while managing global strategic priorities. 
 xviii
The current GFM process method cannot quantify and objectively compare the 
specifics of platform considerations and strategic priority. This model highlights the areas 
where there may be trade-space for additional allocation opportunities. For example, if 
the only means to provide capability to a specific ISR requirement is allocating manned 
aircraft, the model will show what requirements will be affected to meet that limitation. 
Additionally, by interpreting the results, the CCDR can assess where their requirement 
priorities are evaluated globally across all of the CCDR’s requirements. The Joint Staff 
can evaluate the data to verify that the results support the military objectives of the 
National Military Strategy. If the results do not support the strategic objectives then the 
CCDR priorities and the force provider capacity must be scrutinized to mitigate the 
capability and requirement gaps. The impact implications are important to the Combatant 
Commanders for mitigation options and important to the SECDEF for accepting the risk 
associated with the recommendation. 
Combining the optimization model described throughout this thesis with a risk 
informed model that can be implemented for the force allocation of all ISR capabilities is 
a logical evolution that optimizes the force allocation decision process that informs the 
SECDEF for force decisions and responsibility. This thesis critically examines the GFM 
ISR allocation process and the factors that influence it. With the insight gained about the 
process, the proof of concept applied a methodical optimization formulation to a complex 
ISR force allocation problem that is complicated further by significantly less capacity 
than demand. The research, methodology, and analyses presented successfully prove that 
this optimization model will objectively inform senior decision makers in the Department 





Global Force Management (GFM) is a force-allocation process-driven system that 
distributes military forces across the globe to meet Combatant Commander objectives. 
The goal is to match military capabilities provided by the Services to Geographic 
Combatant Commander requirements. This thesis is a proof of concept for an 
optimization model that maximizes the distribution of finite number of assets to a 
prioritized list of requirements. 
Chapter I begins with a broad description of GFM and the documents that direct 
and guide the process. It introduces how GFM addresses and balances risk to both the 
Services and the Combatant Commanders. This chapter asks the question, “What can be 
added to the GFM process to objectively inform senior decision makers in the 
Department of Defense for intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) Global Force 
Management allocation?” Although GFM addresses the allocation of all military 
capabilities, this thesis focuses on intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance 
capabilities; specifically full motion video. The requirements demand for ISR and full 
motion video significantly exceeds global capacity of assets available. This makes ISR 
full motion video capability an ideal candidate for optimization. 
The methodology outlined in Chapter II breaks down the GFM process into 
decisional process steps. It identifies who the decision makers and influencers are in 
each step. The purpose of Chapter II is to develop an understanding of the GFM process 
as it exists today and to get a sense its complexity. With this foundational understanding, 
the paper describes the specifics of the ISR allocation process. ISR allocation 
recommendations are based on a combination of objective and heuristic data 
and variables.  
Chapter III introduces the objective function which maximizes the number of 
hours of ISR capability provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders in to meet 
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prioritized mission objectives. It introduces the indices, parameters, and constraints that 
shape the implementation of the model.  
Chapter IV describes in detail, the indices, parameters, and constraints introduced 
in Chapter III using notional data. It describes the assumptions made in the model 
development. The model applies a methodical approach using known data and informed 
assumptions to develop reasonable notional scenarios for implementation in the model. 
This chapter describes the analyses of the results.  
Chapter V summarizes the success of the optimization model and recommends 
continued development of the model to include all ISR capabilities. It also recommends a 
model that takes into account risk informed factors. Building on both models, we can 
apply the next iteration to the emergent allocation process. 
1. Global Force Management System Process 
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directs the Global Force Management 
(GFM) allocation process in the Dissemination and Guidance for the Employment of the 
Force.1 The GFM process organizes and distributes military forces to meet Geographic 
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) requirements.  
The National Strategic Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National 
Military Strategy direct, guide, and inform the GFM process. The National Strategic 
Strategy establishes national priorities; the National Defense Strategy guides the 
Department of Defense, and the National Military Strategy provides strategic direction. 
The following strategic planning documents guide GFM: 
 Unified Command Plan signed by the President of the United States 
(POTUS) 
Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the combatant commands, 
identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines 
authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and 
                                                 
1 Secretary of Defense. 2015. (U) “Dissemination of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force.” 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. This document is classifed SECRET. 
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gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command. The President of 
the United States approves the UCP. The CJCS publishes the UCP for the 
commanders of combatant commands. 
 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) carries out the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy and provides guidance 
to combatant commander and the JCS to accomplish tasks and missions 
based on current military capabilities.  
 Global Force Management Implementation Guidance  
The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) 
establishes procedures for assignment, allocation, and apportionment of 
U.S. military forces. The GFMIG includes a military risk matrix.  
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approves the GFMIG. 
 Guidance for Employment of the Force  
The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides both the 
president’s guidance for contingency planning and conveys the SECDEF’s 
guidance to focus on the use of existing Department of Defense forces to 
accomplish near-term objectives.  
The GEF establishes the defense posture for a 2–15-year timeframe 
The GEF inherently accepts risk and informs decision makers across the 
DOD to make risk-informed decisions. The GEF prioritizes greatest 
national security risks and highest consequence issues.  
 
The allocation process looks across the entire DOD to identify and recommend 
the most appropriate and responsive force that can meet CCDR requirements. Each force 
request culminates in a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) decision and subsequent 
deployment order to allocate a force. The forces come from several sources, including: a 
Service Secretary such as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force; a CCDR’s 
assigned forces; or forces from other DOD agencies. The SECDEF allocates the forces to 
the requesting CCDR based on informed recommendations from the Joint Staff. 
The allocation process illustrated in Figure 1 is the OV-1 diagram from the Joint 
Staff Global Force Management Enterprise Integration Architecture document (Joint 
Staff 2014). The Global Force Management process provides feasible sourcing options to 
the SECDEF with the decision support process to assess quickly and accurately current 
and future impact and risks associated with proposed force changes. Each allocation 
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recommendation balances force provider risk to force with CCDR risk to mission. 
Assessing force allocation risk is complex. A CCDR must assess risk to current 
operations while at the same time predicting risk to strategic operational plans.  
 
Figure 1.  OV-1 Allocation Operational Concept Graphic. 
Source: Joint Staff (2014). 
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This chapter will step through the GFM allocation process and develop an 
understanding of the GFM process depicted in Figure 1. The allocation process begins 
when the SECDEF assigns missions and operations to CCDRs. To meet the mission and 
operations objectives, CCDRs request forces with the capabilities required to achieve 
mission objectives. For example if a CCDR is required to conduct a strike into a 
particular area, the CCDR needs to know what and where the targets are. To do that, the 
CCDR may require an ISR capability such as full motion video to build situational 
awareness of the battle space. The CCDR will request full motion video as the force 
requirement.  
The GFM process supports both rotational requirements and emergent 
requirements. Rotational requirements are those operations and missions that CCDRs and 
Force Providers are able to plan for from fiscal year to fiscal year. For example, to 
conduct Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Commander United States Central 
Command’s (USCENTCOM) strategy requires forces to continue from one fiscal year 
into the next. USCENTCOM will continue to require ISR capabilities to monitor the 
situation in Iraq. This plan informs the demand for USCENTCOM’s rotational 
requirements. Emergent requirements are force capabilities needed in addition to the 
rotational requirements. Emergent requirements happen during the current fiscal year. For 
example, during the Ebola Crisis in the Commander United States Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), USAFRICOM requested additional 
medical support capabilities to augment the forces allocated in fiscal year 2014. 
Emergent requirements typically address the “what’s changed?” in a CCDR’s AOR 
within the fiscal year.  
The Joint Staff will validate each CCDR’s force requirement. Validation includes 
verifying requirements, assigning a priority, and ensuring the CCDR has the proper 
authorities to conduct the operation with the requested capability. The Joint Staff as the 
Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) will assign the Joint Force Provider (JFP) for conventional 
forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), or mobility. The JFC and JFP will coordinate 
with the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy, who are the Force Providers (FP) to 
determine sourcing options to meet the CCDR’s requirements. Force providers look 
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across the complete spectrum of their Service capabilities and balance the need to meet 
the requirement with the risk to the impact to Service force readiness. With the high 
demand for combat forces across the globe continuing since 2011, the risk to Service and 
Force readiness is the most significant factor in force allocation recommendations to 
the SECDEF. In many force capabilities, there is no additional capacity to meet all 
of the CCDR’s rotational requirements and emergent requirements without a 
reallocation of forces. This is the case with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) capabilities.  
The JFC and JFPs critically review the FP nominations including analyzing risk to 
develop a recommended joint sourcing solution. The Joint Staff will socialize the 
recommended sourcing solution to the CCDRs and FPs to accurately address both risk to 
mission and risk to force impacts in order to inform the SECDEF for force allocation 
decision. When the FP and/or the CCDR do not agree with a recommendation, the issue 
becomes contentious. The contentious issue will go through a resolution process 
consisting of action officer and General Officer/Flag Officer (GOFO) level forums. A 
requirement becomes contentious for several reasons: 
1. The FP does not have the capacity to meet a CCDR’s requirement to a 
satisfactory level.  
2. The proposed solution meets the requirement, but it is missing the specific 
unit type wanted by the CCDR.  
3. The CCDR has a valid requirement yet there is no capacity to meet the 
requirement without reallocation from another CCDR. 
4. The recommended solution reallocates existing forces in one CCDR’s 
AOR to a different CCDR.  
Situation (4) causes many contentious issues for ISR requirements. ISR capability 
demand far exceeds ISR capacity. When the force providers have all available forces 
allocated and there is no additional capacity for emergent requirements, it may be 
necessary to reallocate forces from one CCDR to another. The Joint Staff makes the 
recommendation to reallocate the assets, and the SECDEF is the approval authority to 
reallocate assets from one CCDR. 
  7
The Joint Staff will staff all resource allocation recommendations. Once staffed, 
the recommendations become part of the draft Global Force Management Allocation Plan 
(GFMAP). The Joint Staff will staff the GFMAP to the FPs and CCDRs prior to 
submitting the sourcing recommendations to the SECDEF. The Joint Staff briefs the draft 
order through the Joint Staff Directorates and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), OSD leadership. When the 
SECDEF approves the GFMAP, the Joint Staff publishes the GFMAP. The GFMAP is 
the SECDEF Deployment Order (DEPORD) for all allocated forces. 
2. Risk Assessment 
The GFM process takes into account military risk and strategic risk. Strategic risk 
evaluates and judges both the probability and consequence of threats to the nation. The 
GFMIG defines military risk as risk to mission and risk to force; it uses the terms to 
express the overall risk associated with fiscal year requirements. Title 10, U.S.C., section 
153 requires CJCS annually to “assess the nature and magnitude of the strategic and 
military risks with executing” National Military Strategy missions. 
Risk to mission is the CCDR’s ability to execute assigned missions at acceptable 
human, material, financial and strategic costs. Risk to mission should include the 
CCDR’s assessment of what aspects of the mission will assume risk and for how long. 
Effective risk to mission assessments includes risk mitigation measures and the impact of 
those mitigation measures to the mission. In other words, what requirements will not be 
met and how will that affect meeting mission objectives? This thesis will identify what 
requirements will not be met. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH THESIS QUESTION 
How do we quantify the tradeoff necessary to reduce contentious decision-making 
in the Global Force Management allocation process? 
This thesis is a proof of concept of an optimization model for ISR allocation 
within the Global Force Management process. The challenge with the current ISR 
allocation process is objectively quantifying the reason behind a recommended sourcing 
solution for ISR global allocation. Current military operations across the globe 
  8
experience more demand from the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) than the 
Force Providers have assets available to meet the GCC requirements. The Joint Staff, in 
concert with USSTRATCOM, use many factors to prioritize allocation of assets to 
include determining which GCC gets the assets and for how long. The decision 
influencers recommend a resource allocation solution based on experience, force 
capacity, GCC demand, and the strategic environment provided by guidance from the 
National Security Council (NSC).  
C. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This ISR capability optimization proof of concept will take an ISR capability that 
the GCCs require such as full-motion video (FMV), and show how the allocation can be 
optimized to meet requirements across the GCCs. To do understand the complexities of 
the ISR force allocation, the next chapter will describe the allocation process. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes how a Combatant Commander’s capability requirement 
receives a force allocation. The Global Force Management process is explained step-by- 
step starting with the CCDR’s requirement identified. It ends with a force deployed to 
meet that requirement and it identifies critical decision points. This chapter also describes 
the additional steps of the ISR allocation process.  
A. GFM PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
The design of the entire global force management process allows the SECDEF to 
make risk informed and prioritized decisions for the employment of the force. The 
product of the GFM process is deployed military forces to the Geographic Combatant 
Commanders (CCDR). The GFM process in Figure 2 describes how the CCDRs request 
forces through a request for forces (RFF) through the validation process, and receives 
force allocation as ordered by the SECDEF. For the purpose of this report, the scope and 
specifics of the process is unclassified. For ISR requirements, it is common for the issue 
to become contentious during the resource allocation process. There are not enough ISR 
assets to meet CCDR requirements (Secretary of Defense 2016). The entire process is to 
allow the SECDEF to make risk informed decisions for the employment of the force. 
 
1. The GFM process begins with a RFF from the Geographic Combatant 
Commander. The request is for a capability needed in that GCC’s area of 
operations that does not already exist.2 An example of a capability request 
is for ISR full motion video from USEUCOM to monitor the refugee crisis 
of people leaving Syria across the Mediterranean Sea. The Joint Staff 
receives the RFF via an electronic message. 
 
2. The Joint Staff verifies that the GCC has the authority for the capability of 
the RFF requested and the force meets the guidance of provided in 
Chapter I. When the RFF meets validation requirements, it moves to 
                                                 
2 Secretary of Defense. 2015. (U) “Dissemination of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force.” 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. This document is classifed SECRET. 
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validation. If the RFF does not meet the validation requirements, it returns 
to the CCDR with requests for more information in order to meet the 
validation requirements. 
3. Decision Point. In validation, the J31 Deputy Director approves or denies
the validation of the RFF. Validated RFFs proceed to the resource
allocation process. Not validated RFFs return to the CCDR. Some of the
reasons for not validating an RFF include but not limited to the following:
a. The RFF is asking for a validated requirement that already exists.
b. The RFF is asking for a requirement that does not meet the
SECDEF’s strategic direction.
c. The RFF is requesting a relook at sourcing without a significant
change in the CCDR strategic situation.
Validation simply determines if the CCDR has valid SECDEF 
approved mission with fiscal authority, legal, and that there is not 
an existing requirement for the same capability (Joint Staff, 2014). 
Validation does not consider whether the Force Providers have the 
capacity to source the request. Validated RFFs may or may not 
have forces allocated. The SECDEF assumes all of the risk to the 
CCDR for not providing resources to meet the demand when a validated 
capability lacks resources. This happens when there are not enough 
forces to meet all of the requests from all of the COCOMs without 
breaking the force providers’ ability to reconstitute forces from year 
to year and surge capacity to meet emergent requirements. Many ISR 
RFFs are validated yet do not receive the required resources. 
4. The validated RFF is assigned a GEF priority and a request is sent to the
Force Providers for force allocation feasibility. With some requirements,
multiple services can source the requested capability. For example, the
Navy and the Air Force can source ISR—Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
capabilities with the EP-3 Aries and the RC-135 V/W Rivet Joint. A single
Service can only source other capabilities. For example, the Navy is
obviously the only Service that can provide a maritime presence with a
Carrier Strike Group. The Joint Staff as the Joint Force Coordinator, will
use the Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM) to prioritize fulfillment
11
of requirements.3 The FADM is guidance that provides a flexibility for 
making force allocation recommendations among competing requests 
(Joint Staff, 2014). The details of the FADM are classified. However, the 
intent of the FADM is to align GFM allocation recommendations with 
Department of Defense priorities. It is a tiered framework where the 
higher the FADM priority, the more critical the requirement is to strategic 
end-states and top priority planning efforts (Joint Staff 2014).  
5. Decision Point. The Joint Staff sends the RFF to the appropriate service or
services for force allocation recommendations. If the service can meet the
request, the service accepts the responsibility to the provide resources to
the RFF. If the service cannot meet the requirement, the service must
provide the reason including the risk assessment as to why it cannot meet
the request. In some cases, the services will agree to provide resources
with the capability with some exceptions or comments, which may outline
a different unit to meet the same capability.
a. For ISR requirements, there is an additional step in the process.
JFCC-ISR will review the ISR RFF and provide force allocation
recommendations to the force providers and the CCDRs through the
Joint Staff. JFCC-ISR recommendations use trend analysis of
requirements from year to year, service capacity to process the
collection, and operational constraints such as basing options, over
flight permissions, and command and control architecture
limitations (Joint Staff 2014).
6. If the Force Provider has the capacity to meet the requirement, the FP
sends the resource allocation recommendation to the Joint Staff. If the
force provider cannot meet the requirement, the request returns to the Joint
Staff for additional staffing, and the recommended solution is contentious
between the Force Provider, the CCDR, and the Joint Staff.
7. The Joint Staff will work with both the force provider and the CCDRs to
agree on an acceptable resource allocation solution. During the resolution
process, force providers provide force availability data and answer
questions to give decision makers a better understanding of why the
3 Secretary of Defense. 2015. (U) “Dissemination of the Guidance for the Employment of the Force.” 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. This document is classifed SECRET. 
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request is not feasible. Additionally, for many RFFs, the questions go back 
to the CCDRs for amplifying information. The purpose of this step is to 
resolve the issues with an acceptable solution from the CCDR and the 
Force Providers at the lowest decision maker level.4 
7a. Decision Point. The first step in the adjudication process of a 
contentious issue is at the Action Officer level via a Secure Video 
Teleconference (SVTC). The required participants include the action 
officers from the Joint Staff, the GCCs, and the Services. The SVTC is an 
opportunity for each stakeholder to make the case why the RFF does not 
have the resource allocation as required by the CCDR. The Joint Staff is 
the broker of this step in the process. In some cases, the issue is resolved 
at this level with a negotiated resource allocation for or a formal 
withdrawal of the RFF from the CCDRs, removing the RFF. If the issue is 
not resolved and remains a contentious, it is elevated to the One-Star 
General Officer Flag Officer (GOFO) level. 
7b. Decision Point. If unresolved after the action-officer level process, the 
contentious issue proceeds to a one-star GOFO level SVTC. The required 
participants include the one-star GOFO from the Joint Staff, each CCDR, 
and each Service force provider. This SVTC is an opportunity for each 
stakeholder to make the case why the recommendation does not meet the 
CCDR requirement. The Joint Staff is the broker of this step in the 
process. In some cases, the issue is resolved at this level with a negotiated 
resource allocation recommendation or a formal withdrawal of the RFF 
from the GCCs, removing the RFF. If the issue is not resolved and 
remains a contentious, the issue is elevated to the Three-Star GOFO 
Operations Deputies (OPSDEP) tank.  
7c. Decision Point. If there is no resolution by this stage in the process, the 
contentious issue proceeds to a three-star GOFO Operations Deputies 
(OPSDEP) tank for resolution. The required participants include the three-
star Operations Deputy GOFO from the Joint Staff, each GCC, and each 
Service force provider. This meeting is an opportunity for each 
stakeholder to make the case why the recommendation does not meet the 
4 Secretary of Defense. 2015. (U) Dissemination of the Guidance for the Employment of the 
Force. Department of Defense, Washington, DC. This document is classifed SECRET. 
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CCDR requirement The Joint Staff is the broker of this step in the process. 
In some cases, the issue is resolved at this level with a negotiated resource 
allocation recommendation or a formal withdrawal of the RFF from the 
GCCs, removing the RFF.  
 
7d. The unresolved issue remains contentious and is elevated to the Four-
Star JCS tank. The JCS Tank adjudicates very few RFFs. For example, in 
fiscal year 2015, one ISR contentious issue went to the JCS for resolution. 
The specifics of the issue are classified; however, the context of the issue 
affected the overall force health of the Air Force remote piloted aircraft 
capability and required the attention and strategic prioritization of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. With a resource allocation decision made for the RFF, a 
risk to force assessment by the Service and a risk to mission assessment by 
the CCDR is included in the sourcing recommendation.  
 
8. The Joint Staff compiles the RFFs and the sourcing solutions for SECDEF 
approval to deploy forces via the Global Force Management Allocation 
Plan (GFMAP) (Secretary of Defense 2016). The GFMAP authorizes the 
transfer of and attachment of forces from supporting CCDRs and 
Secretaries of the Military Departments and attachment to a supported 
CCDR. If a force allocated to one CCDR is shifted as a force sourcing 
solution to another CCDR, the CCDR from whom the force is reallocated 
is not a Force Provider, but must be consulted prior to reallocation.5 
Emergent ISR sourcing solutions often require reallocation across CCDRs 
due to the lack of overall ISR capacity. Prioritization on which CCDR will 
lose capability at the expense of another CCDR is an experienced-based 
subjective decision that would benefit by the implementation of an 
objective optimization tool set. 
 
9. Decision Point. The Joint Staff briefs the details and the reason for the 
recommendation to the SECDEF on contentious issues for decision in 
GFMAP. The brief includes risk to mission and risk to force impacts. The 
SECDEF will make a risk informed decision to approve or deny each 
                                                 
5 Secretary of Defense. 2016. (U) “Global Force Management Implementation Guidance FY2016-
2017.” Department of Defense, Washington, DC. This document is classifed SECRET. 
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force recommendation in the GFMAP. The SECDEF assumes the risk to 
the CCDR mission when the allocation solution does not meet the CCDR 
requirements. The SECDEF assumes the risk to the force when the force 
allocation is at the expense of the force provider’s force readiness. 
10. The SECDEF approves the GFMAP and orders the force via the Global
Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) (Secretary of Defense
2016). 
11. The process ends when the forces sourced deploy to the CCDR’s AOR.
15
Figure 2.  GFM Process Diagram Shows how the CCDRs Request Forces, the Requirement is Validated, 




B. CURRENT ISR ALLOCATION PROCESS DISCUSSION 
The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force allocation process 
includes additional steps in the force allocation process. Typically, ISR capabilities such 
as full motion video (FMV) are in high demand by CCDRs. However, the availability of 
ISR platforms is severely limited. ISR capability is described as high demand and low 
density. Because of the ability of ISR platforms to potentially service multiple CCDRs 
from a common operating location and competing demands for mission critical 
requirements, the allocation of ISR forces includes close coordination between the Joint 
Staff, CCDRs, force providers, and the Joint Functional Component Command for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC ISR).  
JFCC ISR is responsible to the Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense to 
recommend the most effective use of the limited number of ISR platforms in support of 
CCDR objectives. For CCDR ISR requirements, the CCDR develops Concept of 
Collection Operations (CONOPS). The Global Force Management Allocation Policies 
and Procedures, CJCSM 3130.06A, direct JFCC ISR to evaluate CCDR ISR CONOPS to 
establish collection priorities to support of Operations Plans (OPLAN) and Concept Plans 
(CONPLAN). JFCC ISR analyzes the CONOP and accounts for all ISR requirements 
against categorized FAM priorities and operations areas. The ISR CONOP includes 
descriptions that address how all ISR collection assets including CCDR theater assets, 
national technical means (space-based), and Coalition partner capabilities are integrated 
to meet intelligence collection requirements.  
JFCC ISR’s assessment of the ISR CONOPS includes assumptions, operational 
constraints such as but not limited to aircraft basing options, over flight restrictions, 
collection processing limitations, C4I architecture limitations, and aircraft availability. 
The CCDR’s ISR CONOPS should include a “what cannot be accomplished” risk 
statement if the requirements are not sourced or partially sourced. JFCC ISR’s force 
allocation recommendations balance ISR gaps and shortfalls with CCDR priorities and 
force availability. Additionally, JFCC ISR uses trend analysis for comparing (increasing, 




requirements for the current fiscal year. The analysis informs force allocation 
recommendations.  
JFCC ISR makes the force allocation recommendation to the Joint Staff after the 
CCDR have submitted their ISR requirements to the Joint Staff and after the force 
providers have offered the available assets for allocation. The strategic priority of the 
FADM and previously described heuristics inform the recommendation. The proof of 
concept of the ISR allocation optimization model will apply similar heuristics and 
prioritization factors to inform both the Joint Staff and JFCC ISR in order to provide 
optimized recommendations to the SECDEF for the allocation of forces. Chapter III will 
introduce the model’s objective function, which is to maximize the number of ISR 












III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter introduces the Global Force Management intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance allocation model. This model attempts to maximize the number of 
hours of ISR capability provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders in a fiscal 
year to meet mission objectives. The optimization model uses a mixed integer linear 
programming formulation.  
A. GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, 
AND RECONNAISSANCE ALLOCATION MODEL FORMULATION 
1. Indices 
i  Full Motion Video (FMV) ISR platform type. For the purpose of this 
model, the following platforms will provide FMV capability to meet CCDR 
requirements: 
 MQ-1B Predator 
 MQ-1C Grey Eagle 
 MQ-9 Reaper 
 P-3C Orion 
 Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System 
(EMARSS) 
j Combatant Commander with FMV requirements 
 United States Africa Command (UAFRICOM) 
 United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) 
 United States European Command (USEUCOM) 
 United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
 United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) 





2. Parameters and Data 
valueij              The FADM weighted platform consideration for ISR type i provided to CCDR j
capacityi         Number of ISR hours available from force provider for platform i hours/day 
req j                 Number of total ISR hours required by CCDR j  hours/day 
lrei                              Number of LRE sorties of ISR type i available from force provider  sorties/day 
lre_ sortiesi     Number of LRE sorties required to support one ISR type i sortie hours/sortie 
 
3. Decision Variables 
X ij                   Number of ISR FMV hours from platform i, allocated to CCDR j    hours/day 
Yij                    Number of LRE sorties of type i allocated to CCDR j    sorties/day 
 
4. Objective Function 
The goal of the ISR FMV allocation optimization model is to maximize the hours 
of FMV allocated to each CCDR to meet the prioritized mission requirements.  
 
MAX Z  valueij
ij
 Xij                        (1) 
5. Constraints 
X ij  capacityi
j
 i                         (2)  
Constraint (2) ensures that the ISR sorties allocated to all CDDRs do not exceed 








Elastic constraint (3) ensures CCDR each type ISR platform requirements are met 
if possible. 
 
_ ,                   (4)ij i ijX lre sorties Y i j   
Constraint (4) ensures that LRE are allocated to support ISR platform sorties 
when required. 
 
                                   (5)ij i
j
Y lre i   
Constraint (5) requires that LRE sorties allocated to all CCDRs do not exceed the 
force provider’s capacity.  
 
X ij  0 ij                                         (6) 
Constraint (6) states that ISR FMV allocation hours must be non-negative. 
 
Yij  integer ij                                  (7) 
Constraint (7) enforces integer restrictions on all LRE platform decision variables. 
 
This chapter introduced the equations that build the model. Chapter III goes into 
detail about the indices, parameters, and constraints that influence the objective function. 








IV. DATA, RESULTS, AND ANALYSES 
This chapter describes in detail the indices, parameters, and constraints introduced 
in Chapter III using notional data and the assumptions made in the model development. 
The notional data provides results and informs the analysis of the model influenced by 
FADM and platform type. This chapter describes the analyses of the results. The model 
was solved using Microsoft Excel with Solver add-in. 
A. HYPOTHETICAL DATA AND DEVELOPMENT 
The ISR allocation optimization model applies to any of the ISR requirement 
capabilities, including but not limited to Full Motion Video (FMV), Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT), Communications Intelligence (COMINT), and other intelligence collection 
capabilities. The complexity of FMV force allocation makes FMV the ideal capability to 
use for a proof of concept. FMV is real-time video imagery used for intelligence 
collection (Lockheed Martin 2016). For the purpose and scope of this thesis, FMV will be 
limited to airborne platforms. It does not include space-based imagery systems.  
FMV is critical to the war fighter. It provides CCDRs real-time pattern of life of 
the battle space. It is one piece of the intelligence information puzzle. FMV combined 
with satellite imagery such as Google Earth and electronic warfare data provides decision 
makers the situational awareness required to meet mission objectives (C4ISRNET 2016). 
Figure 3 is a snapshot of one image of FMV. As a still image, it shows three vehicles in a 
single-file line along a road. Using FMV as a stream of video imagery over time, it 
provides point of origin of this group of vehicles and ultimate destination of these 
vehicles. Knowing where the trucks came from helps decision makers to distinguish if the 
vehicles are friendly, hostile, or potentially hostile forces on the move. This is an 
oversimplified example of the potential of FMV that illustrates how critical maintaining 
awareness of the operating area is to CCDRs. FMV combined with an armed platform 
allows for the rapid engagement of a time-critical target. FMW is a critical requirement to 




Hypothetical data is used to keep this thesis unclassified. The platform 
capabilities come from a small sampling of ISR FMV platforms that have sufficient 
open-source information to make the model relevant. The hypothetical CCDR 
requirements are derived from and loosely based on historical data from GFMAP force 
allocations. Actual CCDR requirements, force capacities, and FADM priorities are 
classified. The model uses a methodical approach using known data and informed 
assumptions to develop reasonable scenarios to implement in the model.  
 
Figure 3.  Full Motion Video (FMV) Example. 
Source: Lockheed Martin (2016). 
B. FORCE ALLOCATION MODEL DISCUSSION 
This section describes in detail the formulation of the optimization model. It 
describes the indices of ISR platform types and CCDR requirements. The key to the 
understanding the optimization formulation is in the understanding of how the parameters 
are defined. The parameters are a combination of known objective data such as the force 
provider capacity of a specific platform, and an attempt to quantify heuristic data such as 




Understanding how the parameters effect the optimized solution informs the 
decision influencers to which parameters influence the formulation the most. The impact 
is useful to the force provider, the CDDR, and the Joint Staff. The force provider may use 
the data to apply additional funding to the area that has the most significant gains. The 
force provider can also use the data to identify areas that present a risk to force and 
inform the decision to determine if there are significant gains to meeting CCDR 
requirements while accepting additional risk to force. For CCDRs, this shows objectively 
where the CCDR has determined how important a requirement is and how that same 
importance influenced the resource allocation. By looking at the results, the CCDR can 
see where their requirement priorities are evaluated globally across all of the CCDR’s 
requirements. The Joint Staff can evaluate the data to verify that the results support the 
military objectives of the National Military Strategy. The Joint Staff can use the 
formulation to run recommendation scenarios to model where largest gains from risk to 
force and risk to mission can be made. The information can influence recommendation to 
the SECDEF to order a force provider to provide additional assets at the expense of long-
term force readiness. This optimization model provides transparency that is not easily 
interpreted or understood in the current ISR force allocation process.  
1. Indices 
a. Full Motion Video Platform Types 
The optimization model uses a sampling of FMV capable aircraft to prove the 
concept. Although there are many FMV capable aircraft, the aircraft types selected 
include platforms from each Service that have allocable ISR aircraft. The selection 
includes manned and remotely piloted aircraft to show that the optimization model 
reflects current capabilities and that it can adapt to reflect future capabilities.  
(1) MQ-1B Predator 
The MQ-1B Predator is a remotely piloted reconnaissance aircraft built by 
General Atomics Aeronautical System Inc. The United States Air Force is the force 




control station, operators, and maintenance to support 24-hour missions anywhere in the 
world (Air Combat Command 2015). Pilots at the ground control stations fly the aircraft 
using data-link.  
An MQ-1B carries a full motion video imaging sensor. It can either armed or 
unarmed with two laser-guided air to ground AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (Air Combat 
Command 2015). The aircraft has a range of 770 miles (Air Combat Command 2105). 
The combination of persistent FMV and air to ground armament allow the CCDR 
capability to engage time critical targets. 
 
Figure 4.  MQ-1B Predator (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson). 
Source: Air Combat Command (2015). 
(2) MQ-1C Gray Eagle 
The MQ-1C Gray Eagle is an unmanned aircraft system built by General Atomics 
Aeronautical System Inc. The United States Army is the force provider for USA MQ-1C 
Grey Eagles. The Army deploys the Grey Eagle platoon as part of the Combat Aviation 




control station, communication equipment, ground support equipment, and 127 people 
make up one Gray Eagle platoon (United States Army 2016).  
The Gray Eagle can carry an electro-optical sensor and up to four AGM-114 
Hellfire missiles that provide FMV and strike capability to the CCDR (General Atomics 
Aeronautical 2016). The MQ-1C has a 2,500 miles range and an endurance profile of 27 
hours (United States Army 2016). Q-1C Grey Eagle (General Atomic photo). Source:  
(General Atomics Aeronautical 2016) 
 
Figure 5.  MQ-1C Grey Eagle. Source: United States Army (2016) 
(3) MQ-9 Reaper 
The MQ-9 Reaper is a remote-piloted aircraft built by General Atomics 
Aeronautical Systems. The United States Air Force is the MQ-9 force provider. The MQ-
9 Reaper provides combined FMV and strike capability against time-sensitive targets 
(Air Combat Command 2015). Reaper aircraft use multiple types of imaging sensors to 
provide full motion video capability (United States Air Force 2015). Like the MQ-1C, the 




The MQ-9 units have four aircraft, a ground control station, and communication 
equipment. The 1,150 miles aircraft range is significantly more than the range MQ-1B 
Predator (United States Air Force 2015). In some cases, CCDR prefer the MQ-9 Reaper 
to the MQ-1B Predator due to the additional range and armament capacity of the Reaper 
platform. 
 
Figure 6.  Armed MQ-9 Reaper (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt). 
Source: Air Combat Command (2015). 
(4) P-3C Orion 
The P-3C Orion is a U.S. Navy full motion video capable patrol aircraft built by 
Lockheed Martin (Lockheed Martin 2016). The P-3C Orion is a manned aircraft with 
multiple sensors including surface search radar and electro-optical real time video 
cameras. The P-3C Orion can be armed with AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-84K SLAM-ER, 
AGM-65F Maverick missiles, Mk46/50/54 torpedoes, rockets, and mines (United States 
Navy 2016). The Orion has a range of 1,548 miles and an endurance of more than 12 
hours (Janes IHS 2016). Unlike the remote piloted MQ-1B, MQ-1C, and the MQ-9 




FMV to prosecute targets on the ground (Lockheed Martin 2016) . Additionally the P-3C 
Orion has the capability to deliver anti-ship and anti-submarine ordnance to meet specific 
over water CCDR requirements.  
 
Figure 7.  P-3C Orion, captured by U.S. Navy Photo/Photographers Mate 2nd 
Class Elizabeth L. Burke. Source: United States Navy (2016). 
(5) Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System  
The Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System 
(EMARSS) is an United States Army ISR aircraft capable of providing FMV. EMARSS 
is an example of a successful Army program of record program that is taking former U.S. 
Air Force Liberty C-12 aircraft and integrating them into the Army EMARSS program 
(United States Army 2016). EMARSS and programs like it, are getting ISR capabilities 
to the warfighter through rapoid acquisition authority (United States Army 2016). The 
number and types of platforms in the optimization model can expand and include new or 





Figure 8.  U.S. Army Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance System. Source: United States Army (2016). 
b. Combatant Commanders 
The Unified Command Plan of the United States divides the world into 
geographic regions and assigns responsibilities to geographic combatant commanders. 
Figure 3 illustrates the geographic division by CCDR. 
(1) United States Africa Command 
United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is responsible for the Unites 
States interests in Africa. It builds and strengthens military relations with African 
countries and the African Union to increase security and counter transnational threats 




(2) United States Central Command 
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is responsible for United States 
military operations in 20 countries including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen. The 
mission of USCENTCOM is increasing stability in the region through international 
partnerships (U.S. Department of Defense 2011). 
(3) United States European Command 
United States European Command (USEUCOM) is responsible for building and 
maintaining military partnerships with European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian nations, 
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to increase the security in 
EUCOM’s area of responsibility (U.S. Department of Defense 2011). 
(4) United States Northern Command 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for 
continental United States, Alaska, Mexico, Canada, portions of the Caribbean and 
surrounding waters. It also oversees the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD).  
(5) United States Pacific Command 
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has the largest geographic area of 
responsibility including 36 nations and the waters of the United States west coast 
extending to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2011). USPACOM builds and fosters military partnerships to 




(6) United States Southern Command 
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is responsible for an area of 
31 nations in Latin America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean Sea. 
USSOUTHCOM’s security efforts include promoting human rights, to deter illegal illicit 
trafficking and conducting multinational military exercises that build and foster 
partnerships (U.S. Department of Defense 2011).  
 
Figure 9.  Commander’s Area of Responsibility. 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense (2011). 
(7) Combatant Commander Prioritization Factor Discussion 
When implementing the optimization model, it is important for decision 
influencers to distinguish when force allocations are exclusively weighted and factored to 
FADM priority. For example: NORTHCOM has the responsibility to defend the United 





if the U.S. is attacked, USNORTHCOM may have the highest FADM priorities for many 
of its requirements. However, the resource allocation may need to be balanced to provide 
ISR assets to a CCDR that is actively engaged in combat operations. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the U.S. is involved in large-scale combat operations in 
USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM areas of responsibility.  
In further development of this model and refining the factors that influence the 
optimization, a refinement of how priority will factor into the risk to potential OPLANs, 
versus the risk to ongoing combat operations will make the optimization model more 
relevant. 
2. Parameters 
a. valueij   
The valueij parameter is a numerical value assigned to the priority for sourcing of 
each requirement of CCDR j by platform i. It is based on a prioritization derived from 
FADM and platform considerations. The higher the FADM priority assigned by the Joint 
Staff, the larger the value that will applied to the requirement in the model. The actual is 
FADM is classified. Table 1 is an unclassified notional example of how the FADM 
priority is weighted with a value. A FADM of 1.1.1 has the highest priority and weighted 
the most. Assigning a weight factor to FADM priority enables the objective formula to 
allocate FMV capability to CCDR requirements that have the highest priority. According 
to the fiscal years 2015 and 2016 Global Force Management Allocation Plan, this is not 
the case (Secretary of Defense 2015; 2016). CCDRs prioritize against what they want. 
Not necessarily optimized against the FADM priorities. In this model, the highest FADM 







Table 1.   FADM Priority and Weight Factor 
FADM Weight Factor FADM Weight Factor FADM Weight Factor
1.1.1 100 2.1.1 60 3.1.1 30 
1.1.2 99 2.1.2 59 3.1.2 29 
1.1.3 98 2.1.3 58 3.1.3 28 
1.1.4 97 2.1.4 57 3.1.4 27 
1.1.5 96 2.1.5 56 3.1.5 26 
1.1.6 95 2.1.6 55 3.1.6 25 
1.1.7 94 2.1.7 54 3.1.7 24 
1.2.1 93 2.2.1 53 3.2.1 23 
1.2.2 92 2.2.2 52 3.2.2 22 
1.2.3 91 2.2.3 51 3.2.3 21 
1.2.4 90 2.2.4 50 3.2.4 20 
1.2.5 89 2.2.5 49 3.2.5 19 
1.2.6 88 2.2.6 48 3.2.6 18 
1.2.7 87 2.2.7 47 3.2.7 17 
1.3.1 86 2.3.1 46 3.3.1 16 
1.3.2 85 2.3.2 45 3.3.2 15 
1.3.3 84 2.3.3 44 3.3.3 14 
1.3.4 83 2.3.4 43 3.3.4 13 
1.3.5 82 2.3.5 42 3.3.5 12 
1.3.6 81 2.3.6 41 3.3.6 11 
1.3.7 80 2.3.7 40 3.3.7 10 
This table is an example of how notional FADM priority assigns a weight factor used in 
the valueij parameter for each requirement. The FADM weight factor represents the 








FADM is not the only factor that influences valueij. In this model, each CCDR 
requirement is further categorized into platform i to allow platform consideration to 
influence the objective function. Equation (8) shows that FADM weight factor is 
multiplied across each CCDR’s platform considerations. The platform consideration 
factor for CCDR i, scalei, determines to what extent the objective function is influenced 
by specific platform preferences for each requirement. The Joint Staff and JFCC ISR with 
the CCDR determine the platform consideration factor for each requirement.  
value ij Wi
i
 (scalei ) j                                 (8)
Where,
Wi   FADM weight factor
Scalei  platform consideration factor
 
Table 2 illustrates how notional CCDR requirements affect valueij. For example, 
USAFRICOM requirement number 118003 shows that any FMV platform is suitable by 
having a multiplier of 1 for each platform except MQ-9. The MQ-9 notional multiplier is 
1.1, meaning the MQ-9 is preferred. As a result, the valueij for that requirement is 
influenced accordingly.  
In another example, USCENTCOM requirement number 218003 has 0 as a 
multiplier to each platform except the P-3C AIP which is 1. This means that the preferred 




Table 2.   Example of valueij. Table for Model Calculations  
 
The columns contain the CCDR capability requirements. The grey rows contain the 
capability requirement. The light blue rows represent the FADM weight factor. The 
yellow rows beneath the weight factor contain the platform consideration factor. The dark 
blue rows represent valueij computed using Equation (8). 
b. capacityi  
The capacityi parameter is the Number of ISR hours available from force provider 
for platform i. Provided by force provider in units of number of sorties per month 
for each platform type. The sorties per month are converted to sorties per day then the 
units are converted to hours per day for the model using the unclassified notional 
planning factors. 
c. reqj  
The reqi parameter is the numbers of ISR capability hours required by CCDR j. 
CCDRs provide requirements in units of hours per month of a specific capability. For this 
model, the unit of measurement of the capability converts from hours of FMV required 
per month to per day. The CCDR does not specify a particular platform such as MQ-9 or 
EMARSS. The requirement is for capability (Secretary of Defense 2016). 
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM
Requirement Tracking Number 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003
Requirement Hours/Month 1100 200 300 4700 700 22100
Requirement Hours/Day 36 7 10 155 23 727
FADM 1.2.3 3.1.1 1.2.3 2.2.5 1.2.2 1.2.3
FADM Weight Factor 91 30 91 49 92 91
MQ‐1B 1 1 1 1 1 0
MQ‐1C 1 1 1 0 1 0
MQ‐9 1 1 1.1 1 1 0
P‐3 AIP 1 1 1 0 1 1
EMARSS 1 1 1 1 1 0
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM
Valueij 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003
MQ‐1B 91 30 91 49 92 0
MQ‐1C 91 30 91 0 92 0
MQ‐9 91 30 100.1 49 92 0
P‐3 AIP 91 30 91 0 92 91




d. lrei  
The lrei parameter is the number of Launch and Recovery Elements (LRE) of ISR 
type i available from force provider for platform i. MQ-1B and MQ-9 each require a LRE 
to support the takeoff and landing of each sortie. An LRE is platform specific. For 
example, a MQ-1B LRE can only support MQ-1B sorties. It cannot support MQ-9 
sorties. The force provider can only support a limited number of LREs. The number of 
LRE crews that can operate each LRE at the location combined with the number of 
systems that can control the aircraft set the LRE capacity limit. Additionally, each LRE 
has a maximum number of sorties that a single LRE can support. For the purpose of this 
model, the number of sorties each LRE can support is five sorties per day for each 
platform type. The LRE parameter in this model only applies to MQ-1B and MQ-9. The 
Air Force is the force provider for the LREs and sets the limit to both how may LREs are 
available for force allocation and how many sorties each LRE can support. The LREs 
deploy to the location from where the MQ-1B and MQ-9 sorties take off and land. 
e. cap_lrei  
The cap_lrei parameter is the number of sorties per day that each LRE of platform 
type i can support. 
f. lre_sortiesi  
The lre_sortiesi parameter is the numbers of sorties per day that support ISR of 
type I available from force provider. The Force Provider sets the total number of sorties 
that flown each day in support of CCDR. The number of Remote Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 
pilots, RPA sensor operators, and the Process, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) 
capacity available limit the number of RPA sorties available for allocation. Each sortie 
requires aircraft, RPA pilot crew, RPA sensor operator crew, and PED crew. 
g. collecti  
The collecti parameter is the number of hours of ISR type i collection per sortie. 
JFCC ISR and the force provider determine the sortie length for the number of collection 




3. Decision Variables 
a. Xij  
Xij is the number of ISR FMV hours from platform i allocated to CCDR j. The 
units convert from hours per month to hours per day to simplify conversion to sorties per 
day to align with the sortie per day limitation set by the force provider. 
b. Yij  
Yij is the number of LRE sorties of type i allocated to CCDR j. The units convert 
from hours per month to sorties per day to align with the sortie per day limitation set by 
the force provider. 
4. Objective Function 
The goal of the ISR FMV allocation optimization model is to maximize the hours 
of FMV allocated to each CCDR to meet the prioritized mission requirements. The 
optimization model uses a mixed integer linear program formulation.  
MAX Z  valueij
ij
 Xij                        (1) 
C. CONSTRAINTS 
1. Sourcing Capacity Constraints 
To maximize the utilization of a limited number of assets, each CCDR’s 
requirement is equal to or greater than the sourcing recommendation. The optimized 
solution will not provide a CCDR more allocation of resources than what the requirement 
demand is.  
X ij  capacityi
j
 i                         (2)  
Constraint (2) ensures that the ISR sorties allocated to all CDDRs do not exceed 
force provider’s capacity. However, the goal of the model is to try and allocate resources 




makes the model infeasible. To make the model feasible an elastic variable constraint (3) 
is applied.  
 
Elastic constraint (3) ensures CCDR each type ISR platform requirements are met 
if possible. 
2. Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) Constraints 
X ij  lre _ sortiesiYij i, j                   (4)  




 i                                   (5) 
Constraint (5) requires that LRE sorties allocated to all CCDRs do not exceed the 
force provider’s capacity.  
3. Nonnegativity Constraint 
X ij  0 ij                                         (6) 
Constraint (6) states that ISR FMV allocation hours must be non-negative. 
4. Integrality Constraint Integrality Constraint 
Yij  integer ij                                  (7)  





D. MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
This section discusses the results of the Global Force Management Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Allocation model. The model allocates forces to meet 
the most requirements using the objective function. The first sub-section describes how 
penalties are applied to the objective function to manage the trade-off between LRE 
constraints and CCDR requirement constraints. The second sub-section describes the 
model results of keeping the valueij parameter constant across all of the CCDR 
requirements and only applying FADM as the priority. The third sub-section describes 
the results of the model after adding CCDR platform consideration to each requirement. 
Both scenarios use the same twenty CCDR requirements and same the force provider 
capacities. The requirements are notional. Seven of the requirements have the same 
FADM priority to simulate the complexity of c CCDR’s competing priorities. 
1. Objective Function 
The objective function (1) shows how FADM and platform consideration 
influences the model solution. 









Breaking down the objective function into its three parts shows how the 






The sum of the product of valueij * Xij in the objective function encourages the 
model to maximize the resource allocation to the requirements that give have the highest 
value. The valueij, is influenced by FADM priority and platform consideration. The 
parameter valueij is the weight factor applied to the requirement. The higher the valueij, 








Subtracting the sum of the product of the LRE_penalty * Yij in the objective 
function ensures that an LRE is only allocated when necessary. A penalty factor 
influences when it is necessary to allocate a LRE. To minimize the penalty and drive 
force allocation efficiency, the LRE_penalty maximizes the number of sorties at each 
LRE. In implementing the model, the LRE_penalty can be manipulated to influence how 
easy it is for the model to allow an LRE allocation. The greater the penalty factor, the less 
likely the formula model will allocate an LRE to a requirement. The lesser the penalty 
factor, the more likely an LRE will be allocated to each requirement  
The objective function must balance the LRE_penalty with the overall intent. In 
this scenario CCDR’s requirements are greater than the total ISR FMV capacity. 
Requirements need all of the available capacity allocated to CCDR requirements and we 
want to maximize the number of sorties that each LRE supports. If the LRE_penalty is set 
too high, the objective function will not allocate LREs to the requirements. If the penalty 
is set too low, LREs are allocated without maximizing the efficiency in the number of 
sorties that each LRE can support.  
 (valueij _ penalty)(elastic _var iable
ij
  
Lastly, subtracting the sum of the product of valueij_penalty and its associated 
elastic variable ensures feasibility through the elastic constraint of equation (3). The 
valueij_penalty is the trade-off between FADM priority and CCDR’s platform preference, 
as represented by the platform preference factor. The higher the valueij_penalty, the 
greater the FADM priority influences the optimized solution. The lower the 





2. Base Model—FADM Prioritized Results  
As decision influencers, may want to provide an optimized recommendation 
strictly based on FADM priority agnostic to the consideration of the type of platform to 
meet each requirement. This scenario assumes any of the FMV ISR platforms can equally 
meet the capability requirement. Using the data developed in the previous sections, this 
subsection presents the initial or base model results. The lower chart in Table 3 shows 
that the model allocates one-hundred percent of the force provider capacity. However, 
only 902 hours per day of the 1902 hours per day requirement are allocated. This means 
that 47 percent of the CCDR requirement is satisfied.  
The highest thirteen FADM requirements receive FMV capacity. Twelve of those 
13 requirements are fully allocated resources. Requirement number 218005 is the next 
highest FADM priority of 1.3.1, with a FADM weight factor of 86. As shown in Table 3 
of the Hours Allocated row, the model allocates 39 hours per day.  
Implementing a FADM prioritized model can inform decision makers by 
providing a solution that shows how forces could be allocated if the objective function is 
strictly enforcing GEF direction. With fewer assets available than CCDR requirements 
demand, this method will also show the capability gaps in force allocation. For the force 
providers and DOD budget personnel, the gaps highlight areas where additional resources 
can be committed to meet strategic objectives. Although a clearly prioritized optimization 
model is useful for planning purposes, it does not reflect the reality of ISR FMV force 
allocation. In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the SECDEF ordered force allocation was not 
exclusively based on FADM priority (Secretary of Defense 2015; 2016). The GFMAP 
considered several additional factors including emerging strategic goals, domestic and 





Table 3.    Base Model -FADM Prioritized Results  
 
The upper chart shows the complete set CCDR requirements used in the (base) model and what platforms were allocated to 
meet those requirements. In this (base) model platform consideration is the same for all requirements. The lower chart 
contains the force provider capacity by platform and how many hours and the percentage of the capacity is allocated by 
platform. 
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 61800
Requirement Hours/Month 1100 200 300 4700 700 22100 180 13700 8700 550 730 180 90 30 180 240 100 720 360 3000
Requirement Hours/Day 36 7 10 155 23 727 6 450 286 18 24 6 3 1 6 8 3 24 12 99
FADM 1.2.3 3.1.1 1.2.3 2.2.5 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.3 1.2.3 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.6 1.2.6 1.1.2 2.1.7 1.2.2 3.3.7 2.1.7 2.1.7
FADM Weight Factor 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐1B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MQ‐1C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MQ‐9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P‐3 AIP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EMARSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
Valueij 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 61800
MQ‐1B 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐1C 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐9 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
P‐3 AIP 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
EMARSS 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
Results 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 61800
MQ‐1B 0 0 0 0 12 144 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐1C 0 0 0 0 0 259 6 11 0 4 0 6 3 1 6 0 3 0 0 0
MQ‐9 0 0 0 0 0 168 0 28 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P‐3 AIP 0 0 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EMARSS 36 0 10 0 11 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐1B LRE Allocated 0 0 0 0 1 12 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐9 LRE Allocated 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hours Allocated 36 0 10 0 23 727 6 39 0 18 24 6 3 1 6 0 3 0 0 0








































3. CCDR Platform Consideration Sensitivity Analysis 
Combatant Commanders have the best insight to what specific platforms can best 
meet their requirements. However, coordination is required that looks across the whole 
ISR enterprise for capabilities. JFCC ISR is responsible for providing that coordination. 
For example, a partner nation may not allow remotely-piloted aircraft flown from their 
country. In order to mitigate those external factors and meet the mission requirement, the 
CCDR or JFCC-ISR may prioritize a manned platform type. Additionally, certain 
platforms are better equipped for particular missions. This section conducts some 
sensitivity analysis by changing input data from our base model presented in section 
IV.D.2. 
With no other changes to the base model, Table 4 shows how sensitive the model 
is to a change of valueij parameter for a particular platform. This change may represent 
when the platform consideration is modified based on new information or just to examine 
model sensitivity. In this example, the scale associated with requirement number 218003 
changes for ISR platforms of EMARSS and P-3 AIP from 1 to 1.5 and which results in a 
change in the associated scales for remotely piloted aircraft to 0.5 from 1. The associated 
valueij changes from 91 to 136.5 and from 91 to 45.5 for the manned and remotely piloted 
aircraft, respectively. These changes simulate the preference for manned ISR platforms to 





Table 4.   Combined CCDR and FADM Prioritized Model Results Example 1   
 
Requirement number 218003 in Table 4 shows how platform consideration influences the objective formula. 
 
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 618002
Requirement Hours/Month 1100 200 300 4700 700 22100 180 13700 8700 550 730 180 90 30 180 240 100 720 360 3000
Requirement Hours/Day 36 7 10 155 23 727 6 450 286 18 24 6 3 1 6 8 3 24 12 99
FADM 1.2.3 3.1.1 1.2.3 2.2.5 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.3 1.2.3 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.6 1.2.6 1.1.2 2.1.7 1.2.2 3.3.7 2.1.7 2.1.7
FADM Weight Factor 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐1B 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MQ‐1C 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MQ‐9 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P‐3 AIP 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EMARSS 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
Valueij 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 618002
MQ‐1B 91 30 91 49 92 45.5 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐1C 91 30 91 49 92 45.5 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐9 91 30 91 49 92 45.5 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
P‐3 AIP 91 30 91 49 92 136.5 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
EMARSS 91 30 91 49 92 136.5 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
Results 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 618002
MQ‐1B 36 0 0 0 12 0 0 132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐1C 0 0 10 0 11 0 6 108 104 18 24 6 3 1 6 0 3 0 0 0
MQ‐9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P‐3 AIP 0 0 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EMARSS 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐1B LRE Allocated 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐9 LRE Allocated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hours Allocated 36 0 10 0 23 212 6 450 104 18 24 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0








































The last row of Table 4 shows that the model allocates FMV capability to the 
fourteen highest FADM priority requirements. Twelve of the fourteen requirements 
receive 100 percent allocation. Requirement number 218003 and 218006 receive partial 
allocation. Requirement number 218006 has a FADM priority of 1.3.3 and a value, or 
objective function coefficient, of 84. It is the next lowest FADM prioritized requirement 
and the last requirement to receive the equivalent of 36 percent of its FMV requirement. 
Requirement number 218003 has a FADM priority of 1.2.3 and a value of 91. It received 
29 percent (212 of 727 hours per day) of its requirement. The results show that the 
platform consideration scalei of 1.5 for manned aircraft for this requirements received 
some allocation, but at the expense of overall allocation of FMV ISR, because the change 
of remote piloted platform consideration scale to 0.5 resulted in no FMV capability for 
that requirement. The MQ-1B, MQ-1C, and MQ-9 capacity was allocated to lower 
FADM priority requirements (e.g., requirement number 218005), because the value of 86 
is more than twice the value of 45.5 for which requirement number 218003 receives for 
one hour of FMV.  
The objective function manages the trade-off between FADM priority and 
platform consideration. Table 5 illustrates how FADM influences the objective function 
to a greater extent than platform consideration does. Using the same data illustrated in 
Table 4, in addition to changing the platform consideration of requirement number 
418002 from 1 to 1.5, the objective function did not allocate any MQ-1B or MQ-1C 





Table 5.   Combined CCDR and FADM Prioritized Model Results Example 2  
 
Requirement number 418002 in Table 5 shows that FADM influences allocation trade-off more than platform consideration. 
 
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 618002
Requirement Hours/Month 1100 200 300 4700 700 22100 180 13700 8700 550 730 180 90 30 180 240 100 720 360 3000
Requirement Hours/Day 36 7 10 155 23 727 6 450 286 18 24 6 3 1 6 8 3 24 12 99
FADM 1.2.3 3.1.1 1.2.3 2.2.5 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.3 1.3.1 1.3.3 1.2.3 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.6 1.2.6 1.1.2 2.1.7 1.2.2 3.3.7 2.1.7 2.1.7
FADM Weight Factor 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
MQ‐1B 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 1 1 1 1
MQ‐1C 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 1 1 1 1
MQ‐9 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P‐3 AIP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EMARSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
Valueij 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 618002
MQ‐1B 91 30 91 49 92 0 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 81 92 10 54 54
MQ‐1C 91 30 91 49 92 0 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 81 92 10 54 54
MQ‐9 91 30 91 49 92 0 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
P‐3 AIP 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
EMARSS 91 30 91 49 92 91 91 86 84 91 91 91 88 88 99 54 92 10 54 54
USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM
Results 118001 118002 118003 218001 218002 218003 218004 218005 218006 318001 318002 318003 318004 318005 418001 418002 518001 518002 618001 618002
MQ‐1B 36 0 0 0 12 0 0 132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐1C 0 0 10 0 11 0 6 108 104 18 24 6 3 1 6 0 3 0 0 0
MQ‐9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P‐3 AIP 0 0 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EMARSS 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐1B LRE Allocated 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MQ‐9 LRE Allocated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hours Allocated 36 0 10 0 23 212 6 450 104 18 24 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0








































Combining and balancing FADM and platform consideration into the 
optimization model allows decision makers a model that more closely resembles current 
allocation methods. This result is expected because the valueij parameter is made up of 
two components, the platform consideration (i.e., the scalei, and FADM weight Wi). The 
first represents the returns to scale or consideration for a particular platform and the 
second represents the tradeoff among the different requirements. In other words, the 
former provides the regional focus to a specific geographic area or preference and 
the later provides more of a global influence that balances strategic priorities across all of 
the CCDRs.  
As this chapter has shown, this model highlights the areas where there may be 
trade-space for additional allocation opportunities, which may not be apparent using the 
current process outlined in Chapter II. For example, if the only means to provide 
capability to a specific ISR requirement is allocating manned aircraft, the model will 
show what requirements will be affected to meet that limitation. Additionally, by 
interpreting the results, the CCDR can assess where their requirement priorities are 
evaluated globally across all of the CCDR’s requirements. The Joint Staff can evaluate 
the data to verify that the results support the military objectives of the National Military 
Strategy. If the results do not support the strategic objectives, then the CCDR priorities 
and the force provider capacity must be scrutinized to mitigate the capability and 
requirement gaps. The impact implications are important to the Combatant Commanders 
for mitigation options and important to the SECDEF for accepting the risk associated 




V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis critically examines the Global Force Management allocation process 
and the factors that influence it. With the insight gained to the process, this proof of 
concept applies a methodical optimization formulation to a complex ISR force allocation 
problem that is complicated by significantly less capacity than demand. This optimization 
model and its methodology developed as part of this thesis uses full motion video 
capability and notional requirements to model the applicably of optimization, but may be 
easily generalized for use in other ISR capabilities (e.g., COMINT, in the Global Force 
Management allocation process). The data and platforms will differ; however, the basic 
optimization formulation will be the same.  
The base model only considered FADM for allocation prioritization.  Results 
show that with only 902 hours per day of FMV capacity to meet 1902 hours per day of 
requirements, the optimized solution provided 100 percent of the requirement capability 
to 12 of the 20 CCDR requirements. Additionally, the model provided a partial allocation 
of 39 hours per day or nine percent of the requirement to the single next lowest FADM 
priority requirement. These results are useful to inform senior decision makers within the 
DOD of which requirements will not receive a capability allocation. The results can be 
compared against the actual Global Force Management Allocation Plans to highlight 
which lower FADM priorities are actually receiving a force allocation. The differences 
can show a strategic misalignment between CCDR priorities and global strategic 
priorities. For force providers and DOD budget personnel, the gaps highlight areas where 
additional resources can be committed to meet strategic objectives. 
Combining and balancing FADM and platform consideration into the 
optimization model allows decision makers a model that more closely resembles current 
allocation methods. The results of the combined model change if the objective function 
coefficient is modified (i.e., the valueij parameter) for a particular platform. This change 
may represent where the platform consideration is modified based on new information or 
just to examine model sensitivity. The objective function manages the trade-off between 




the force allocations recommendations are made because it takes into account regional 
geographic realities while managing global strategic priorities. 
The research, methodology, and analyses presented successfully prove that 
this optimization model will objectively inform senior decision makers in the Department 








VI. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The next iteration (and a separate thesis project) would be the refinement of this 
model to consider risk. Risk to mission is assumed by the prioritization inherent in the 
FADM. The force provider assumes risk to force in the force offering. These assumptions 
are a good start to rotational fiscal year force allocation. However, the model can be 
adapted to include a risk value. For example, if the Joint Staff or JFCC ISR recommend 
that a force provider increase capacity to beyond what was initially offered, it would be 
useful to account for risk to force specifically in the formulation.  
Risk can be considered in the model using a multi-objective formulation and 
adding risk as a consideration in the formulation. For this method to work, the model will 
assume that valueij is much greater than risk and will ignore risk initially. Then use the 
model to solve for valueij. Finally, the model will use the solution for valueij to establish 
an additional constraint and solve for riskij. The model’s objective is to compare the risk 
to force of adding capacity at the expense of future force readiness against the risk to 
mission of the CCDR for not meeting a capability requirement.  
A risk informed model would become the basis for an optimization model that 
can address emergent requirements. Emergent requirements are CCDR requirements for 
forces within the current fiscal year. As this notional model shows, all of the force 
provider capacity is used. In order to allocate additional capability to new requirements, 
the forces would come from one of three options.  
The first option would be to order additional capacity from the force providers. 
This option comes with a cost to future force readiness. For example, if the 
recommendation is that the Air Force to provide additional MQ-9 capacity, the additional 
qualified pilots and sensor operators needed may come from the training units. Pulling 
instructors from the training unit to meet the demands of operational requirements 
reduces the number people who are able to train the next cycle of crews. This may have 
significant impact to follow on rotational capacity. The risk to force would become the 




The second option would recommend the reallocation of additional capacity from 
one CCDR to a different CCDR. For example, USNORTHCOM may need additional 
FMV capability to monitor a Russian exercise off the coast of Alaska. There is no 
additional force provider capacity to allocate to meet the emergent requirement. Notional 
reallocation options to consider include moving counter drug assets out of 
USSOUTHCOM or moving assets out of USCENTCOM who are supporting combat 
operations. In this notional scenario, the risk to USSOUTHCOM mission priority is less 
than the risk to combat operations in USCENTCOM. The risk to mission is the most 
significant factor to the model.  
A third option would include contracting FMV capacity from a commercial 
vendor. This option has a dollar cost associated to it. Using a model that can objectively 
optimize recommendations while taking into account risk, may show that the dollar cost 
is significantly less than the cost to force readiness or the cost to the risk to mission. Not 
only will the model provide context for decision, it will provide transparency to the 
CCDRs, force providers, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense.  
Combing the optimization model described throughout this thesis with a risk 
informed model that can be implemented for the force allocation of all ISR capabilities is 
a logical evolution that optimizes the force allocation decision process that informs the 
SECDEF for force decisions and responsibility.  
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